Development and Analysis of Deterministic Privacy-Preserving Policies Using Non-Stochastic Information Theory

A deterministic privacy metric using non-stochastic information theory is developed. Particularly, minimax information is used to construct a measure of information leakage, which is inversely proportional to the measure of privacy. Anyone can submit a query to a trusted agent with access to a non-stochastic uncertain private dataset. Optimal deterministic privacy-preserving policies for responding to the submitted query are computed by maximizing the measure of privacy subject to a constraint on the worst-case quality of the response (i.e., the worst-case difference between the response by the agent and the output of the query computed on the private dataset). The optimal privacy-preserving policy is proved to be a piecewise constant function in the form of a quantization operator applied on the output of the submitted query. The measure of privacy is also used to analyze the performance of $k$-anonymity methodology (a popular deterministic mechanism for privacy-preserving release of datasets using suppression and generalization techniques), proving that it is in fact not privacy-preserving.Comment: improved introduction and numerical exampl

A Study of Truck Platooning Incentives Using a Congestion Game

We introduce an atomic congestion game with two types of agents, cars and trucks, to model the traffic flow on a road over various time intervals of the day. Cars maximize their utility by finding a trade-off between the time they choose to use the road, the average velocity of the flow at that time, and the dynamic congestion tax that they pay for using the road. In addition to these terms, the trucks have an incentive for using the road at the same time as their peers because they have platooning capabilities, which allow them to save fuel. The dynamics and equilibria of this game-theoretic model for the interaction between car traffic and truck platooning incentives are investigated. We use traffic data from Stockholm to validate parts of the modeling assumptions and extract reasonable parameters for the simulations. We use joint strategy fictitious play and average strategy fictitious play to learn a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of this game. We perform a comprehensive simulation study to understand the influence of various factors, such as the drivers' value of time and the percentage of the trucks that are equipped with platooning devices, on the properties of the Nash equilibrium.Comment: Updated Introduction; Improved Literature Revie